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The physics of quantum systems opens a door to tremen-
dously intriguing possibilities for cryptography, the art and
science of communicating in the presence of adversaries [1].
One major goal of classical cryptography is to certify the
origin of a message. Much like a handwritten signature
on a paper document, a digital signature authenticates an
electronic document and ensures that it has not been tam-
pered with. The importance of digital signatures to mod-
ern electronic commerce has become such that Rivest has
written \[they] may prove to be one of the most fundamen-
tal and useful inventions of modern cryptography." [2] This
is especially true of schemes where the signature can be rec-
ognized using a widely available reference. The security of
all such public key digital signature schemes presently de-
pends on the inability of a forger to solve certain dicult
mathematical problems, such as factoring large numbers
[3]. Unfortunately, with a quantum computer factoring be-
comes tractable [4], thus allowing signatures to be forged.
Here, we present a quantum digital signature scheme which
is absolutely secure, even against powerful quantum cheat-
ing strategies. It allows a sender (Alice) to sign a message
so that the signature can be validated by one or more dif-
ferent people, and all will agree either that the message
came from Alice or that it has been tampered with.
Classical digital signature schemes can be created out of
any one-way function [5]. f(x) is a one-way function if it
is easy to compute f(x) given x, but computing x given
f(x) is very dicult. This allows the following digital sig-
nature scheme [6]: Alice chooses k0 and k1, and publicly
announces f , (0, f(k0)) and (1, f(k1)). Later, to sign a sin-
gle bit b, Alice presents (b, kb). The recipient can easily
compute f(kb) and check that it agrees with Alice’s ear-
lier announcement, and since k0 and k1 were known only
to Alice, this certies that she must have sent the mes-
sage. However, while there are many candidate one-way
functions, none have been proven to be secure, and some,
such as multiplying together two primes (the inverse be-
ing factoring the product), become insecure on a quantum
computer. This deciency leaves a substantial gap in the
cryptographic landscape.
Our quantum digital signature scheme is based on a
quantum analogue of a one-way function which, unlike any
classical function, is provably secure from an information-
theoretic standpoint, no matter how advanced the enemy’s
computers. The key idea we introduce is a one-way func-
tion whose input is a classical bit-string k, and output is a
quantum state jfki (versus, for instance, a function which
maps quantum states to quantum states). Like the above
classical scheme, we will require O(m) qubits to sign a m-
bit message. It is not sucient, however, to simply plug
in jfki in place of f(k). First, due to the no-cloning the-
orem, there can be no perfect equality test for quantum
states. Also, as we show below, the nature of quantum
states provides Alice with non-classical cheating strategies,
and eavesdroppers with non-classical forgery mechanisms.
And unlike classical schemes, only a limited number of
copies of the public key can be issued, or the scheme be-
comes insecure. Despite these diculties, the protocol we
present, when used correctly, allows the probability of any
security failure to be made exponentially small with only
polynomial expenditure of resources.
Let us begin with the quantum one-way function. Sup-
pose we take all classical bit strings k of length L, and
assign to each one a quantum state jfki of n qubits. Fur-
ther, let the states be nearly orthogonal: jhfkjfk′ij  δ for
k 6= k0; this allows L to be much larger than n. Buhrman,
Cleve, Watrous, and de Wolf introduced one such family as
quantum fingerprints, in which L = O(2n) and δ  0.9 [7].
Another family is provided by the set of stabilizer states
[1], with L = n2/2 + o(n2), and δ = 1/
p
2. Both these sets
are easy to create with any standard set of universal quan-
tum gates. A third family of interest uses just n = 1 qubit
per state, and consists of the states cos(jθ)j0i+sin(jθ)j1i,
for θ = pi/2L, and integer j. This family works for any
value of L, and gives δ = cos θ.
The mapping k 7! jfki acts as a sort of \quantum one-
way function" because it is impossible to invert, but easy
to compute and verify. Holevo’s theorem puts limits on
the amount of classical information that can be extracted
from a quantum state [8]; in particular, measurements on
n qubits can give at most n classical bits of information.
Thus, given t copies of the state jfki, we can learn at most
tn bits of information about k, and when L− tn 1, our
chance of successfully guessing the string k remains small.
We take for granted certain properties of classical func-
tions which are no longer so straightforward quantum-
mechanically. Given two outputs jfki and jfk′i, how can we
be sure that k = k0? This is done using a simple quantum
circuit [7], which we shall call the swap-test. Take the states
jfki and jfk′i, and prepare a single ancilla qubit in the state
(j0i + j1i)/p2. Next, perform a Fredkin gate (controlled-
swap) with the ancilla qubit as control and jfk′i and jfki
as targets. Then perform a Hadamard on the ancilla qubit
and measure it. If the result is j0i, then the swap-test is
passed; this always happens if jfk′i = jfki. Otherwise,
if jhfk′ jfkij  δ, the result j0i occurs with probability at
most (1 + δ2)/2. If the result is j1i, then the test fails;
this happens only when k 6= k0 and occurs with probability
1
(1− δ2)/2. Clearly the swap test works equally well even if
the states are not outputs of the function f | if the states
are the same, they always pass the swap test, while if they
are dierent, they sometimes fail.
Another important property is the ability to verify the
output of the function: given k, how do we check that a
state jψi = jfki? This is straightforward: since the func-
tion jkij0i 7! jkijfki is easy to compute, simply perform
the inverse operation, and measure the second register. If
jψi 6= jfki, the measurement result will be nonzero with
probability 1− jhψjfkij2.
Blindly modifying classical cryptographic protocols to
use quantum one-way functions will generally fail. First,
given the output of a classical one-way function, someone
with limited computational ability can learn nothing at
all about the input, whereas jfki always leaks a limited
amount of information about k, the input to the quantum
one-way function. This is why in our signature scheme,
Alice must limit the number of copies of her public keys in
circulation. Second, verication of the identity of jfki can
only be done with some error. Third, quantum cheating
strategies become available; for example Alice (the person
preparing the state) can prepare an entangled initial state,
which enables her to delay choosing k until after she has
given jfki away. This fact spells the doom of any attempt
to use quantum one-way functions to perform bit commit-
ment [9,10], which is one application of classical one-way
functions. However, only Alice has the ability to change the
state, which enables us to use quantum one-way functions
to perform digital signatures.
Our digital signature protocol consists of two stages.
The rst step is the key distribution stage, where Alice
creates and distributes quantum states which we shall re-
fer to as her public keys. The public keys are \public," in
the sense that no particular security measures are neces-
sary in distributing them. If a number of copies fall into
the hands of potential forgers, the protocol remains secure,
provided the honest recipients receive valid keys. Classi-
cally, it is much easier to deal with identical public keys
than with private keys that vary from recipient to recipi-
ent. The only purpose of our key distribution stage is to
check that the public keys are truly indistinguishable. In
the second stage of the protocol, Alice sends a classical
message, and the t recipients use the public keys to ver-
ify that the message was sent by Alice. We shall initially
describe how Alice sends one bit, b; multiple bits could
be sent by repeating the protocol, but we describe a more
ecient method at the end of the paper.
All participants in the protocol will know how to imple-
ment the map k 7! jfki. All participants will also know
two numbers, c1 and c2, thresholds for acceptance and re-
jection used in the protocol. A bound on the allowed value
of c2 will be given as part of the proof of security, below.
c1 can be zero in the absence of noise; the gap c2 − c1 lim-
its Alice’s chance of cheating. We assume perfect devices
and channels throughout this paper, but our protocol still
works in the presence of weak noise by letting c1 be greater
than zero, and with other minor adjustments.
The key distribution stage works as follows:
1. Alice creates a set fki0, ki1g, 1  i  M , of pairs of
L-bit strings. The k0’s will be used to sign 0’s in the
message, and the k1’s will be used to sign 1’s. Note
ki0 and ki1 are chosen independently and randomly for
each i.
2. Alice creates 2t copies of each of the states
fjfki0i, jfki1ig. These will be Alice’s public keys.
3. Alice sends her public keys to a key distribution cen-
ter, and each of the t recipients downloads two copies
of each fjfki0i, jfki1ig. One copy will be used to verify
the message, and one to test for Alice cheating. The
public keys have been labelled by Alice, so the recip-
ients know which key is which (but not the identities
of the individual keys).
4. Finally, for each value of i, the recipients verify that
they all received the same public keys using the swap
test. Each recipient rst performs a swap-test be-
tween their two keys, then each passes one copy
to a single recipient. That recipient checks that
these t test keys remain unchanged when any pair
is swapped. If any of the public keys fail the test,
the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, discard the test
keys.
Assuming all recipients’ public keys pass the swap test,
ideally all the recipients would now have identical public
keys. However, a dishonest Alice may create states which
pass the swap test but are dierent for dierent recipients.
Nevertheless, all the keys are equivalent in the sense that
on average, each recipient will nd a similar number of
correct keys for a given message. Alice can now send a
message b using the following procedure:
1. Alice sends the signed message (b, k1b , k
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b , . . . , k
M
b )
over an insecure classical channel. Thus, Alice re-
veals the identity of half of her public keys.
2. Each recipient of the signed message checks each of
the revealed public keys to verify that kib 7! jfkibi.
Recipient j counts the number of incorrect keys; let
this be sj .
3. Recipient j accepts the message if sj  c1M , and re-
jects it if sj  c2M . If c1M < sj < c2M , the action
taken by recipient j varies with the scenario. For
instance, j might consult with the other recipients.
4. Discard all used and unused keys.
When sj is large, the message has been heavily tampered
with, and may be invalid. When it is small, the message
cannot have been changed very much from what Alice sent.
sj is similar for all recipients, but need not be identical. As
we shall see below, these tampering and forgery scenarios
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are caught using the c2 and c1 thresholds. Forgery is pre-
vented by c2, and cheating by Alice is prevented by a gap
between c2 and c1. Alice might attempt to divide the re-
cipients, but she will almost always fail: she must mind
the gap.
We prove the security of this scheme against two scenar-
ios of cheaters. In the rst scenario, only Alice is dishon-
est; her goal is to get recipients to disagree about whether
a message is valid or not (i.e., she wishes to \repudiate"
it). We show that if one recipient unconditionally accepts
(sj < c1M), then it is very unlikely that another will un-
conditionally reject (sj′ > c2M).
The second scenario is a standard forging scenario. In
this case, Alice and at least one recipient Bob are honest.
Other recipients or some third party are dishonest, and
they wish to convince Bob that a message b0 6= b is valid.
The forgers have complete control of the classical channel
used to send the message, but not the quantum channel
for the distribution of public keys: Bob always receives a
correct set of public keys. (However, we do not assume the
cheaters behave honestly during the key verication stage.)
Naturally, the forgers can always prevent any message from
being received, or cause Bob to reject a valid message, but
we do not consider this to be a success for the cheaters.
Our scheme is applicable to a variety of cryptographic
problems. For instance, Alice may wish to sign a contract
with Bob such that Bob can prove to Judge Charlie that
the contract is valid. In this case, Bob should accept the
contract whenever sB < c1M , and Charlie should accept
whenever sC < c2M . This problem can also be solved by a
classical protocol [11], with the assistance of an anonymous
broadcast channel and recipients with distinct private keys.
However, it is much simpler to distribute public keys, and
we can adapt many classical methods for doing so to our
protocol. The swap-tests in the key distribution stage pro-
vide an explicit check for key indistinguishability which is
implicit in most classical schemes.
The security proof for the second scenario is straight-
forward. In the worst case, the forger Eve has access to
all 2t copies of each public key. By Holevo’s theorem, Eve
can acquire at most 2tn bits of information about each bit
string kib. When Alice sends the signed message, Eve may
attempt to substitute a dierent b0 6= b and (possibly) dif-
ferent values of the kib′ to go with it. However, since she
lacks at least L− 2tn bits of information about any public
key which Alice hasn’t revealed, she will only guess cor-
rectly on about G = 2−(L−2tn)(2M) keys. Furthermore,
if she wishes to change a bit for which she did not cor-
rectly guess a key’s identity, she has only probability δ2 of
successfully revealing the bit. Each recipient measures M
keys, so when b 6= b0, each recipient will nd (with high
probability) that at least (1−δ2)(M −G)−O(pM) public
keys fail. We will pick c2 so that (1− δ2)(M −G) > c2M ,
which means each recipient either receives the correct mes-
sage, or rejects the message with high probability.
For the security proof in the rst scenario, where Alice is
dishonest, we will simplify to the case where there are only
two recipients, Bob and Charlie, but the proof can easily
be generalized to t > 2 recipients.
Here, Alice wishes Bob to accept the message and Char-
lie to reject it or vice-versa. She can prepare any state she
wishes for the public keys, including entangled states and
states outside the family jfki. For instance, she can prepare
a symmetric state, such as jψiB jφiC + jφiB jψiC . Because
this state is invariant under swaps, it always passes all
tests, so that Bob and Charlie believe they have the same
key. But that is an illusion | clever trickery by Alice who
can nevertheless arrange that they disagree on the validity
of the corresponding private key kib. However, Alice can-
not control which of them receives the valid key; it goes
randomly to Bob or Charlie. Thus, since M is large, the
dierence jsB−sC j is O(
p
M) with high probability, which
makes it very unlikely that Bob and Charlie will get deni-
tive but diering results. That is, when one of them (say,
Bob) accepts a message, that is sB < c1M , Charlie almost
never rejects it, which would happen if sC > c2M . The
gap between c1M and c2M protects them against Alice’s
machinations.
Let us now prove this in general. Our goal is to compute
the probability pcheat that Alice can pass all the swap-tests
but achieve jsB−sC j > (c2−c1)M , meaning that Bob and
Charlie disagree about the validity of the message. We do
this by studying a global pure state jΨi, which describes
all of the public keys as well as any state that Alice may
have which is entangled with the keys. Any state which
passes the initial swap-tests will be symmetric between the
test keys and the kept keys; in fact, it is symmetric be-
tween any individual test key and the corresponding kept
key. Therefore, we can safely assume Alice prepares jΨi
with this property.
Now, for each set of keys, the most general state is a
superposition of two types of terms. A type-1 term passes
the swap test, but leaves Bob and Charlie in agreement, on
average, about the validity of the keys, while a type-2 term
frequently fails the swap test. To perform the decomposi-
tion, we expand both the kept keys and the test keys in the
basis jfijfi, jf b?ijf c?i, j+ai, and j−ai, where the rst ket
is Bob’s, the second is Charlie’s, the states jfa?i form an
orthonormal basis with jfi, and jai = jfijfa?i  jfa?ijfi.
A type-1 term is any term for which both the kept and
test keys are in a state jfijfi, jf b?ijf c?i, or j+ai. Note
that any sum of type-1 terms will always pass the swap
test, but also has equal amplitudes for Bob and Charlie to
pass key verication. A type-2 term is any term includ-
ing a j−ai state for the kept keys, the test keys, or both.
For the type-2 terms, we explicitly note the symmetry be-
tween the kept and test keys, meaning the superposition
(j+aij−bi + j−aij+bi)/p2 is the only way j−aij+bi can
appear. That is, any sum of type-2 terms respecting this
symmetry must have at least a 50% chance of failing the
swap test. On the other hand, some superpositions of type-
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2 terms can give dierent chances for Bob and Charlie to
pass key verication.
Expanding every set of keys in jΨi in this way gives a
global state which we can again divide up into two terms:
jΨ1i + jΨ2i. Every summand in jΨ1i contains at most r
type-2 tensor factors, where r = (c2 − c1 − c)M for some
constant c > 0; the rest are type-1 terms. Each type-1 term
has equal amplitude to contribute to sB and sC , so the ten-
sor product ofM−r such terms has a Gaussian distribution
of amplitudes, centered at sB = sC = (M − r)/2 and with
width O(
p
M). That is, most of the weight of jΨ1i falls on
cases where jsB − sC j  r + O(
p
M) < (c2 − c1)M . jΨ2i
consists of terms with more than r type-2 tensor factors.
Since each type-2 term has at least a 1/2 chance of failing
the swap test, jΨ2i passes with probability no larger than
2−r. Note that jΨ1i need not be orthogonal to jΨ2i.
Now we can put this together to obtain a bound on
pcheat. The jΨ1i term might have a good chance of
passing all swap tests, but yields an exponentially small
chance of giving the required separation between sB and
sC . The jΨ2i term might have O(1) probability of having
jsB − sC j > (c2 − c1)M , but only has an O(2−r) chance
of passing all swap tests. The best case for constructive
interference between the two terms gives a total probabil-
ity pcheat at most twice the sum of the two probabilities
for jΨ1i and jΨ2i, which is still exponentially small in M .
Therefore, Alice has pcheat  O(d−M ) probability of suc-
cessfully cheating for some d > 1.
Multi-bit messages can be sent by repeating the above
process, using M pairs of public keys for each message bit.
However, a much more ecient procedure is to rst en-
code the message in a classical error-correcting code with
distance M , and to use a single pair of public keys for each
encoded bit. The previous protocol can be viewed as a spe-
cial case of this using a repetition code. Valid messages are
codewords of the error-correcting code; to change from one
valid message to another requires altering M bits. There-
fore, the above security proof holds with only two changes:
G, the number of keys successfully guessed by Eve, is now
2−(L−2tn)(2N), where N is the length of the full encoded
message. In addition, if Alice attempts to cheat, she can
produce a dierence jsB−sC j = O(
p
N) with type-1 terms.
We should thus haveM scale linearly with N when the lat-
ter is very large.
Note that in a purely classical scheme, the public key
can be given out indiscriminately. This cannot be true of
a quantum scheme: when there are very many copies of
a public key, suciently careful measurements can com-
pletely determine its state, and therefore one may as well
treat the public key as classical. In that case, security
must be dependent on computational or similar assump-
tions. Thus, any quantum digital signature scheme will
necessarily require limited circulation of the public key.
The digital signature scheme provided here has many
potential applications. It combines unconditional security
with the flexibility of a public key system. An exchange
of digital signature public keys is sucient to provide au-
thentication information for a quantum key distribution
session. Quantum digital signatures can be used to sign
contracts or other legal documents. In addition, digital
signatures are useful components of other more complex
cryptographic procedures.
One particularly interesting application is to create a
kind of quantum public key cryptography. If Bob has Al-
ice’s public key, but Alice has nothing from Bob, then Bob
can initiate a quantum key distribution session with Alice.
Bob will be sure that he is really talking to Alice, even
though Alice has no way to be sure that Bob is who he
says he is. Therefore, the key generated this way can be
safely used to send messages from Bob to Alice, but not
vice-versa.
We have demonstrated the existence of an absolutely se-
cure public key digital signature scheme, something which
is not possible classically. Many potential improvements
remain, however. A disadvantage of our protocol is that
it consumes several key bits for each message bit. This
makes key management unpleasant. Classical schemes al-
low reuse of keys and similar capability would be desirable
in an improved quantum signature scheme. Other future
goals, in addition to optimizing the protocol, would be to
devise a method for eciently distributing new public keys
or signing certain quantum states (although it is not pos-
sible to sign a general quantum state). Also intriguing
would be generalization of quantum one-way functions, to
further exploit unique properties of quantum information
for cryptographic purposes.
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